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Abstract— As computer technology has advanced, informa-
tion processing in command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems has become highly complex. The information pro-
cessed by these systems is usually of a very highly sensitive
nature and is entered into specific systems that are physically
isolated from each other. The physical isolation of these sys-
tems makes it cumbersome to exchange information between
systems. The result is inefficient sharing of sensitive informa-
tion in situations where timeliness of exchange could be a life
or death reality. Since the mid 1990’s, increasing efforts have
been placed on improving coalition operations. Many systems
have been created with the goal to improve the sharing of in-
formation and collaborative planning across coalition bound-
aries. The usability of these systems have had mixed levels
of success and improvements will always be necessary. This
paper will briefly describe three advances in telecommunica-
tions technology that could be leveraged to significantly im-
prove coalition operations. These technologies are; the session
border controller (SBC), advances in pattern matching tech-
nology, and multi-protocol label switching (MPLS).
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1. Introduction
As computer technology has advanced, information pro-
cessing in command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) sys-
tems has become highly complex. The information pro-
cessed by these systems is usually of a very highly sensitive
nature and is often sensitive in both hierarchical (top secret,
secret, etc.) levels and non-hierarchical (CANUS, CANUK,
AUSCANUK, etc.) levels. Often, this information is en-
tered into specific systems that are physically isolated from
each other so that mandatory access controls can be main-
tained. The physical isolation of these systems makes it
cumbersome to exchange information between systems of
overlapping security policy. The result is inefficient shar-
ing of sensitive information in situations where timeliness
of exchange could be a life or death reality.
Since the mid 1990’s, increasing efforts have been placed
on improving coalition operations. Many systems have
been created with the goal to improve the sharing of infor-
mation and collaborative planning across coalition bound-
aries. The usability of these systems have had mixed levels
of success.
In general, information domains are separated based on sen-
sitivity of the information that is processed within the do-
main. In some cases, such as in the case of multi-level
secure (MLS) systems, information of differing sensitiv-
ity may be processed within a single system. However,
in the case of MLS systems, the information is still con-
tained by the technology to prevent the inadvertent release
of information from a higher security domain to a lower
security domain. In each case, most systems still follow
the Bell-LaPadula security policy model [1] for control of
access to information of particular sensitivity levels. Ba-
sically, the Bell-LaPadula model allows access to informa-
tion objects based on a “write up” and “read-down” policy.
This means that a subject at a lower sensitivity level can
write into an equivalent or higher sensitivity level, while
a subject of a higher sensitivity level can have read access
to information of an equivalent or lower level sensitivity
level.
While the Bell-LaPadula model is a key policy model for
information security, considerations beyond strict hierarchy
of information causes complications. For example, many
national military systems maintain additional caveats on in-
formation that are not strictly hierarchical. These caveats
may be “eyes only” caveats like CANUS, CANUK, etc. – or
particular operational codewords. Another good example is
the NATO caveat that is placed on information generated
within that information domain. These caveats often cre-
ate subsets of information sensitivity (sometimes termed
“non-hierarchical”) equivalence that become complicated
to control in a coalition environment.
Furthermore, regardless of the presence or absence of par-
ticular sensitivity levels, each nation within a coalition has
national sovereignty considerations that must be handled
in a coalition environment. In most cases, each nation
connecting to a coalition information domain will place
a firewall between their national systems and the coalition
domain. The role of the firewall is to establish access and
information flow control between information domains. In
addition to firewalls, depending on the nature of the infor-
mation, additional cryptographic mechanisms will be used
to ensure the confidentiality of information in transit.
In addition, cryptographic mechanisms provide the means
to verify the integrity of information when received. While
firewalls and cryptography systems provide significant mea-
sure of control over access to and exchange of informa-
tion, they create a complex set of intermediary systems
between two operational users. A basic coalition connec-
tivity picture is provided in Fig. 1. This diagram repre-
sents the conceptual connectivity between any nationally
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sovereign operations environment to a coalition operational
environment.
In the diagram in Fig. 1 the national system operations
represent systems that are under the sole control of a sin-
gle participating nation. These would be systems that are
within the sovereignty of a particular nation. In the coali-
tion operation, there may be many such national systems
connected to the coalition operations domain. The coalition
operations domain is a shared domain of many participating
nations and may often be created for specific operational
purposes.
Fig. 1. Basic coalition connectivity.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, this basic coalition
connectivity diagram will be used to highlight the issues
related to operational needs, created as a result of the pres-
ence of intermediary systems. For the issues described, this
paper will also describe three advances in telecommunica-
tions technology that could be leveraged to significantly
improve current coalition operations. These technologies
are:
– use of session border controller (SBC) technology to
improve interworking of collaborative planning tools
across coalition boundaries;
– use of advanced pattern matching engines for im-
proved information sharing across national domain
boundaries;
– use of multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) explicit
routes (ER) to monitor/control packet flow of sensi-
tive traffic.
2. Collaborative planning tools
2.1. Connectivity and protocol issues
Referring to Fig. 1, systems operating in the UNCLASS na-
tional operational domain that are connected to the coali-
tion operational domain must pass traffic through a fire-
wall. Note that these information domains may alterna-
tively be at some other operationally equivalent sensitivity
level (i.e., sensitive but unclass (SBU)). The firewall con-
trols access and information flow between these information
domains. In general, the firewall policy will be set, such
that all traffic is blocked, except particular types of traf-
fic between particular individuals or machines. In general,
the policy will, as a minimum, place controls based on
a 5-tuple (IP source, IP destination, TCP source, TCP des-
tination, protocol type). Beyond the policies established by
the firewall, network address translation (NAT) compounds
the problem due to the need for mapping and manipulation
of IP addresses at the information domain boundaries.
Classified workstations operating in the national system do-
main are connected in a similar manner via a firewall. How-
ever, note also that Type-1 cryptographic systems are used
to protect the information as it passes through the UN-
CLASS (or other lower operational domains). As a result,
the traffic must be decrypted prior to the firewall in or-
der for the firewall to take appropriate policy decisions and
then be re-encrypted in the coalition environment until it
reaches the classified coalition domain.
In general, security policies are established such that con-
nections between national systems and coalition systems
must be initiated from within the national system and must
use well known (pre-defined) ports. Any unused port is
explicitly blocked. An example of such a policy has been
used by the Canadian Forces in the Joint Warrior Interop-
erability Demonstrations (JWID) and has been described
in [2].
The strict nature of such a policy ensures a strong mea-
sure of control over the flow of information; however im-
plementations limit capabilities for true collaborative plan-
ning. Many collaborative planning tools use a signaling
channel, on a known port, to negotiate a data or session
channel port. Since the data or session port is not known
a priori, the firewall policy is usually configured to block
such traffic. The alternative is to leave a block of ports
open such that the negotiated data port is allowed. While
leaving these ports open solves an operational issue, it also
creates additional security risk. This additional risk is usu-
ally deemed unacceptable and therefore the ports are closed
and the application is denied.
Collaborative planning tools that fall into this category in-
clude voice over IP (VoIP), whiteboarding, chat, video tele-
conferencing (VTC), instant messaging (IM), etc. All of
these applications serve a significant role in coalition col-
laborative planning and most remain a technology challenge
to allow the connection of these tools to national systems.
Thus, the utility of the collaborative planning tools is lim-
ited when national systems specifically deny connection.
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While it may be expected that these limitation have been
solved in recent years since publication of [2], this is not
the case. Since the beginning of 2004, the US government
has released at least two separate solicitations regarding the
issues surrounding collaborative planning tools [3, 4]. It is
recognized that “efficient, seamless ways to share informa-
tion of varying classification levels and political sensitivi-
ties over a single network do not currently exist” [4].
2.2. Session border controller
In 2003, SBCs were voted the number 1 hottest new tech-
nology by Telecom Magazine [5]. Used in the telecommu-
nications industry, SBCs exist “to provide a demarcation
point between two service providers’ VoIP networks, allow-
ing them to manage signalling and control routing for VoIP
traffic” [5]. The key ideas behind the SBC are the manage-
ment of signalling traffic and the routing of the data traffic.
Originally designed to facilitate call setup for VoIP traffic,
the concepts behind the SBC create a controlled interface
between two network domains that are ideally suited for
multi-media applications and protocols – the types of pro-
tocols that support coalition collaborative planning tools.
Sitting at the interface between two information domains,
the SBC intercepts the signalling protocol between two sys-
tems. Taking the example of VoIP, the SBC will monitor
for either of two dominant standards, the session initiation
protocol (SIP) or H.323. When intercepted, the SBC either
directly manages and controls the connection using an inter-
nal application level gateway (ALG), or it uses a separate
control interface protocol to communicate with an exter-
nal ALG system. The mechanisms required to support the
external ALG system are being defined by the Middlebox
Communications Working Group (MIDCOM WG) of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
While the details of SIP and H.323 differ significantly, the
goal is the same, to establish a voice connection between
two VoIP end points (phones). This paper will focus on
SIP as “some observers believe that SIP will become dom-
inant” [6]. SIP is “an application-layer control (signalling)
protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions
with one or more participants. These sessions include In-
ternet telephone calls, multimedia distribution, and multi-
media conferences” [7]. One of the key benefits of SIP
in the context of coalition interoperability is the fact that
it is media independent. This means that the SIP itself is
not tied to a particular media type (i.e., voice), but can
be used for virtually any type of media traffic (i.e., video,
instant messaging, whiteboarding). This is because negoti-
ation of the media type and the parameters of the session
are negotiated during the call setup process.
SIP supports five facets of establishing and terminating
multimedia communications [7]:
– user location: determination of the end system to be
used for communication;
– user availability: determination of the willingness of
the called party to engage in communications;
– user capabilities: determination of the media and me-
dia parameters to be used;
– session setup: “ringing”, establishment of session pa-
rameters at both called and calling party;
– session management: including transfer and termina-
tion of sessions, modifying session parameters, and
invoking services.
A simplified illustration of SIP being used to initiate and
control a session between two end points is provided in
Fig. 2. The initiating end point sends an “Invite” request to
the recipient. Among other fields, the “Invite” will contain
several fields that relate to the routing of the call to the
recipient. These fields are the “Via” containing the address
expected for response; “To” containing the destination uni-
versal resource identifier (URI) and “From” field containing
the source URI.
Fig. 2. Session initiation protocol.
In addition, the SIP invite will contain a “content-type”
field that is used to identify the media application type
that will be described in the body of the SIP invite mes-
sage. For example, the content-type field may identify “ap-
plication/SDP” to identify the session description protocol
(SDP), used for voice. The body of the SIP invite would
contain parameters associated with the SDP that could be
processed by the recipient to enable the media type. The
“content-type” and the body of the SIP payload are critical
to the SIP message as it will contain the IP address and
dynamic port assignments for any collaborative planning
applications. This information is essential for the operation
of the session border controller, as will be described below.
Assuming that the parameters of the invite are accepted,
and then the recipient of the invite responds with an “OK”
message. This message is acknowledged by the originator
using an “Ack” and the media session is established.
During the course of a session, either end may add or re-
move other media sessions or types as required, by negoti-
ating these sessions through the existing SIP session. When
either end point terminates the session, a “Bye” message is
sent to the other party, which is acknowledged by an “OK”
message.
Not included in the illustration of SIP in Fig. 2 is the SIP
use of proxies. Within the definition of SIP, the protocol
allows for the use of intermediate proxies that are used to
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relay the messages from the initiator to the recipient. Typi-
cally a SIP call will not go directly between two end points
but will instead pass through proxies at the boundary be-
tween different network domains. In the case of a connec-
tion to a coalition network, a proxy would sit at the bound-
ary between the national domain and the coalition domain.
It is possible; however, that additional proxies will be re-
quired as the call request is passed through various points
in the network. This would depend on the overall network
connectivity.
A session border controller acts as a firewall that uses an
application level gateway programmed to understand SIP.
ALGs go deep into the data in the SIP packet and parse
the “content-type” and payload. This allows the ALG to
determine the IP addresses and dynamic ports that are re-
quired to enable the data ports of the collaborative planning
applications. By understanding which ports need opening,
the SBC dynamically opens only those ports needed by
the application, leaving all others securely closed. This
technique of opening small numbers of ports in the fire-
wall dynamically is called “pinholing”. One of the key ad-
vantages of the ALG is that the constant monitoring of
the session ensures immediate knowledge of call termi-
nation, allowing the “pinhole” to be closed immediately
as well.
As described earlier, NAT causes difficulties in the use of
collaborative planning tools. A SIP proxy is used to provide
NAT traversal. The proxy has knowledge of the IP domain
on both sides of the proxy, and separates the SIP call into
two separate calls: one from the end point in the national
domain to the proxy and one from the proxy to the coalition
domain. The proxy is an intermediary control point and
resolves the NAT issue. In most cases, the ALG will also
incorporate a proxy and therefore is able to handle both
NAT issues and the dynamic assignment of ports.
In some instances, the ALG of an SBC will be imple-
mented in a separate device from the firewall. In this case,
the SIP messages will be routed to the separate ALG for
processing. The separate device will then dynamically con-
trol the firewall by telling it the IP address and UDP
(or TCP) port information determined from the SIP pay-
load. This approach using a separate device is being pro-
moted by the MIDCOM WG in the IETF and is illustrated
in Fig. 3.
The advantage of the MIDCOM scheme is that the fire-
wall is not burdened by the impact of processing the SIP
messages. Once the session is established, and pinholes
are created, only the media streams are processed by the
firewall and the impact of media dependent characteristics
for latency, jitter and quality of service are minimized. In
addition, once implemented with a MIDCOM interface, the
firewall no longer needs to be upgraded for each new ap-
plication service. Instead, the ALG can be upgraded sep-
arately, thereby minimizing the operational impact on the
firewall.
In summary, the SBC provides a dynamic firewall solution
that can be used to improve coalition operations. The na-
Fig. 3. ALG as separate signaling proxy.
ture of the connectivity to a coalition network creates dif-
ficulties due to NAT and the firewall policies that block
applications using dynamic port assignments. The SBC
uses proxy enabled ALGs programmed to understand SIP
that dynamically open ports in the firewall. This dynamic
control of ports is termed “pinholing”. The ALG may be
implemented directly on the firewall, or it may be a separate
device that communicates with the firewall using a MID-
COM scheme. The use of the ALG could allow collab-
orative planning tools to span the national and coalition
information domain while minimizing the risks previously
associated with the dynamic port assignments.
3. Trusted downgrade systems
Another area of connectivity that causes difficulties to coali-
tion operations is the interface between higher and lower
level sensitivity domains. As shown in Fig. 1, a trusted
downgrade system would sit at the interface between the
classified operational domain and the UNCLASS or SBU
domain. The role of a trusted downgrade system is to al-
low the approved release of information from the higher
level domain to the lower level domain. Recalling the
Bell-LaPadula model, it is specifically denied by policy to
“write-down”, that is, to pass information from the higher
domain to the lower domain is forbidden.
However, this security model does not account for the “sys-
tem high” nature of the classified operational domain. “Sys-
tem high” refers to the concept that all information in an
information domain is treated as of the highest classifica-
tion of information processed on the system. This means
that despite the fact that some information may not be SE-
CRET, if it is contained in a system that operates at the
SECRET level then it is treated as if it is SECRET. Con-
sequently, strict enforcement of the Bell-LaPadula model
prevents the valid transfer of information from a higher
domain to a lower information domain.
34
Technology solutions for coalition operations
Recognizing this limitation, there have been several prod-
ucts developed and approved for operation that perform
a trusted downgrade operation. The Radiant Mercury [8]
is one such system developed by Lockheed Martin that
has been in service at least since the mid 1990’s. There
are other similar systems in operation such as the ISSE
Guard [9]. In general, these systems operate on a trusted
computing base (TCB) that has been evaluated and ap-
proved in accordance with one of the trusted computing
evaluation programs, such as the common criteria for in-
formation technology security evaluation (published as ISO
standard 15405). As well, these systems enforce the con-
trol of information release from high to low in one of two
manners. Either they use automated methods to approve
release based on a review of highly formatted messages
such as USMTF messages, or they rely on the approval of
a release authority (i.e., approved email from a valid user
with appropriate rights for release). A concise list of cur-
rent MLS systems in use, including systems used for trusted
downgrade is available at [10].
Taking the RM as an example, the RM release 3.0 serves
two main roles and operates on a Sun platform. The
RM has the capability to automatically review and approve
the release of highly formatted message according to pre-
defined rules. Due to the highly formatted nature of the
message and the extensive rule base, it is possible for ef-
fective controls to be established such that only information
appropriate to the lower sensitivity domain is released to
that lower domain. The second feature of the RM is to
approve the release of imagery files. In this case, the Ra-
dian Mercury operates in a manner similar to most trusted
downgrade systems; an authorized release authority must
identify the file as approved for release and pass the file to
the RM. The RM examines a header that has been applied
to the file by the release authority and passes the approved
image into the lower security domain.
The RM and similar products operate on a TCB that is
based on a trusted operating system running on a general
purpose processor. The operating system is responsible for
the secure containment of information on both the high and
low side of the system and is also responsible for the trusted
transfer of information from the high side to the low side.
This architecture has proved very useful, secure and is able
to meet the needs of some operational requirements. How-
ever, with the growing scope of coalition operations, these
systems may not be able to handle the increased demands
placed on them. The architecture used forces a complete
reassembly of the information content in order for the appli-
cation to scan, parse, review, modify, approve and release
all messages. This is a highly processor and memory in-
tensive process that can be impacted by increased demands
on the system.
On the other hand, modern networking equipment uses dat-
apath technology that is designed to scan, parse, review
and modify information at the packet level. For example,
as a packet is received by a router, the packet header infor-
mation must be scanned and parsed to extract the common
5-tuple information (IP source, IP destination, TCP source,
TCP destination, protocol port). This information is used
as a lookup key for access into a forwarding information
base (FIB). Effectively, the FIB provides instructions to the
datapath to inform it of the actions that should be taken
on the packet. Often, these actions may include the mod-
ification of the packet (i.e., in the case of NAT) prior to
forwarding to the release interface.
At first glance, the technology used in the switch and router
datapath may seem ideally suited to the problem of trusted
downgrade operations at very high rates. However, the
technology widely used in switches and routers has been
engineered for the specific problem of fast header inspec-
tion and forwarding. On the other hand, they are not well
suited to scanning and parsing of information deep within
the payload of a packet or where information spans across
multiple packets. However, the basic technology used in
switches and routers has formed the basis for advanced
pattern matching engines (PME) that support inspection at
higher layers.
3.1. Pattern matching engines
Pattern matching engines have been developed to sup-
port a variety of applications. These applications range
from content switching to intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems (IDS/IPS) to automated anti-virus plat-
forms. PMEs have also been called content inspection en-
gines (CIE) or simply search engines (SE).
There are two main types of PMEs, those that are based
on a Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) tech-
nology and those that are algorithmic based. PMEs may
optionally support both exact match and regular expression
matching criteria. The TCAM type of PME has a direct re-
lationship to the technology in use in the switch and router
datapath for packet forwarding.
PMEs provide considerable potential for the improvement
of the capability of trusted downgrade systems. The match-
ing engine provides the baseline technology needed to per-
form high speed parsing and review of received information
and the technology is intended to provide pattern match-
ing capability deep into packet contents and across packet
boundaries. An anti-virus scanning feature is a typical ex-
ample where the entire payload of a data stream may need
to be scanned. These applications exist in current products
available on the market.
In some cases, PMEs are available directly from component
suppliers. The PAX.portTM line of devices from IDT [11]
is an example of PMEs available from a component sup-
plier. According to the Linley Group, IDT, Inc. is cur-
rently the market leader in SE components, with Cypress
ranked second [12]. PME components hold promise for
the future of trusted downgrade platforms since they of-
fer a flexible program matching language that can support
a wide range of applications. Unfortunately, this also re-
mains their biggest challenge. Following development of
a system, considerable effort may be required to program
the device for particular application needs of trusted down-
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grade applications. Also, the technology is generally used
for matching against relatively short “keys” or “strings”.
Additional research is required to determine the suitability
of such devices for the multiple match criteria that may be
required, for example, in applications supporting military
message formats (i.e., USMTF).
In addition to the general device supplier category, there are
system vendors that have performed extensive research into
PME technology and use this technology in their platforms.
In this case, the technology is often tuned to the particular
application space. For example, the FortiGateTM line of
products from FortiNetTM makes use of the FortiASICTM
to perform fast pattern matching for anti-virus applica-
tions [13].
At this stage, additional research into the use of PME
technology to support trusted downgrade applications is
required. However, it appears that this technology could
provide better baseline platform capability than the general
purpose processors architectures in use today.
4. Controlled flow of sensitive traffic
4.1. Nature of provider networks
In a multinational coalition operation, connectivity for both
tactical and strategic networks is established through net-
work paths that are likely not a part of the normal grid used
by these nations. As new network paths are created, it is
often a requirement to lease the network from providers.
This leaves the network connectivity paths outside the con-
trol of the national military force requesting the service.
This creates a situation where the provider may route the
traffic through other nations where the owner of the data
may not want traffic to pass.
In fact, even using the standard strategic networks that pro-
vide for normal national operations, the provider may route
traffic through areas where the national military may not
want the traffic to go. Fortunately, in the case of normal
day-to-day operations, the provider provisioned network is
often controlled by strict contractual agreements that pre-
clude routing of traffic through particular areas of the world.
Before considering the mechanisms available to control the
flow of sensitive information, it is important to highlight
why the traffic routes are a concern. On the one hand, all
sensitive operational traffic will be protected from disclo-
sure by some cryptographic means. In the case of classi-
fied operational traffic, Type-I cryptography is used, thereby
providing the assurance that even if intercepted, the traffic
is unreadable and is therefore protected. This being the
case, there it can be argued that the route taken by the
traffic is not a concern.
On the other hand, information system security needs to ac-
count for the integrity, availability and accountability of the
information, not just the confidentiality. Integrity protec-
tion ensures that any modification of the traffic is detected.
In addition, it is desirable that opportunities to modify the
traffic be minimized. It may be beneficial to know that
the traffic has been tampered with, but this doesn’t help with
the fact that the correct data has not been received. Also,
availability concerns highlight the importance of ensuring
that that there are no interruptions to service guarantees
from the provider.
Given these concerns, an argument can be made that na-
tional bodies may still desire to have added control of the
path that traffic takes within a provider network. The nature
of routed data networks does not really support this type
of control. Routing protocols are designed to negotiate
best path options for traffic. While the network provider
can establish controls of the paths, the path options are
based on the provider considerations for best path, not the
considerations of the data owner. For example, a provider
will establish paths to maximize bandwidth utilization and
meet quality of service (QoS) guarantees. In some cases,
this may result in the passing of traffic over links that reside
in hostile locations. It would be beneficial for the coalition
operations partners to have some measure of control over
the approval of traffic.
4.2. Multiprotocol label switching and explicit routes
In traditional routed networks, the routing of traffic is based
on the address of the destination of the packets. In the
case of most networks today, this address is an Internet
Protocol (IP) address. By contrast, in label switching,
“instead of a destination address being used to make the
routing decision, a number (a label) is associated with the
packet. . . a label is placed in a packet header and is used
in place of an address (an IP address usually), and the label
is used to direct traffic to its destination” [14].
Label switching provides several advantages to the network
provider [14]; speed and delay, scalability, simplicity, re-
source consumption, and route control.
Route control is the key consideration in the context of
control over coalition traffic paths. Route control allows
the system to designate a specific route path from among
many that may lead to the same destination. This is sort
of like placing an “Air Mail” label on a letter. With the
“Air Mail” label, the letter will take a non-standard path
that, one would hope, has an improved delivery time. In
the same way, a label can be used in a system to control
the route taken. The provider can engineer the network
to route high priority traffic to one set of resources, while
lower priority traffic takes a different path. The removal
of lower priority traffic from the high priority resources
reduces congestion and ensures guaranteed service levels
can be met.
Multiprotocol label switching is published under
RFC3031 [15]. MPLS combines label swapping and
forwarding with network layer routing. “The idea of MPLS
is to improve the performance of network layer routing
and the scalability of the network layer” [14]. Within
MPLS, a label switch path (LSP) is established either
through a route negotiation protocol (i.e., link determi-
nation protocol), or through constraint-based routing. In
constraint-based routing, the LSP is established manually.
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It is possible to combine both automated route protocol
establishment and constraint-based LSP configuration. In
this case, the automated routes would be restricted by
the configured constraints. These constraints are often
associated with quality of service. A router that is aware
of MPLS is termed a label switch router (LSR).
There are two main methods that MPLS uses to choose an
LSP between nodes. In the first method, the LSR is free
to independently select the next hop LSR based on knowl-
edge it has in its routing table. The second method is
called explicit routing. ER is used to define constraints on
the LSP by identifying specific LSRs that are must be used
in the LSP. Assuming that provider networks are MPLS ca-
pable, the concept of ERs could be extended to define con-
straints on the LSP that prevent coalition traffic from pass-
ing through routers that reside on undesired traffic paths.
Note that to control traffic based on sensitivity, MPLS
would need to be extended. As described earlier, ER is
generally used to provide QoS guarantees. Within the var-
ious methods to negotiate an LSP, there is no real concept
of LSR location information, nor is there any notion of an
“approval to process” identifier. This information would be
critical to the extended use required to control the flow of
sensitive information. Furthermore, the constraint-based
link determination protocol (CR-LDP) used to establish
LSPs would need to be extended to include an authenti-
cation mechanism that includes both location and approval
to process criteria.
5. Evaluation considerations
The methods described in this paper are not specifically
related to security products. However, the use of these
methods to support coalition interoperability is identified
to ease the burden of constraints placed on coalition oper-
ations due to security concerns. Therefore, it is important
to note that incorporating these methods into systems sup-
porting coalition interoperability will require trusted prod-
uct evaluations and certification and accreditation for opera-
tion. Current research into the use of these technologies has
not included any consideration for product security evalua-
tion, though there is no known reason to believe that these
techniques could not be included in a secure system design.
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined several issues related to coalition
interoperability. These issues related to:
– the denial of collaborative planning tools across the
national to coalition boundary;
– processing requirements for trusted downgrade plat-
forms;
– the controlled flow of sensitive traffic.
Despite development and operational deployment of many
systems, each of these topics remains a challenge to coali-
tion interoperability.
This paper has identified three technology advances that
could be used to improve coalition interoperability. These
technology advances are:
– the session border controller;
– advances in pattern matching technology;
– use of multi-protocol label switching explicit routes.
Integration of any of these technologies will require trusted
product evaluation and certification and accreditation for
operational approval.
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